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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondents accept the jurisdictional statement set out in Petitioner's Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are properly characterized as follows:
1.

Did the Board err in its factual findings relating to the dealings

between the parties, (a) that the terms and conditions of the verbal and written
offers presented to Petitioner's landowners (hereinafter "Landowners") to lease or
join the Drunkard's Wash Federal Unit (hereinafter "DW Unit") and the
notifications concerning the drilling of the Utah 5-94 Well (the "5-94 Well") and
the Woolstenhulme 5-266 Well (the "5-266 Well") (hereafter jointly the "Wells")
were reasonable and in good faith, (b) that Respondents relied in good faith on the
responses and lack of responses of the Landowners, and (c) that the Landowners
knew or reasonably should have known of the facts surrounding the existence and
operation of the DW Unit and of the drilling of the Wells? (Findings of Fact Nos.
5-11.)
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review of the Board's factual
findings is provided in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l et seq. ("UAPA"), and particularly in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
Factual findings must be affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Such findings will "not be

i

overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the
evidence is permissible." Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah
1998) (quoting Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27
(Utah 1988)). A party seeking to overturn factual findings must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that "despite the supporting facts, and in
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Industrial
Comm% 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). See also In re Sam Oil, Inc., 817 P.2d
299, 302 (Utah 1991) (Board findings of fact in adjudication under the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 et seq. ("Conservation Act"), are
reviewed under the substantial evidence test of § 63-46b-16(4)(g)); and Bennion v. ANR
Production Co., 819 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1991) (factual findings relating to the amount
to be imposed as a nonconsent penalty under the Conservation Act are reviewed under
the substantial evidence test, giving deference to the agency's findings). In making a
review of factual findings, the court considers the facts "and all legitimate inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's findings." Zissi v. State
Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992).
2.

Did the Board err in failing to order pooling retroactive to the dates

of first production of the Wells?
Standard of Review:

The rule regarding retroactive pooling under the

2

Conservation Act as a matter of law was announced and firmly established by the Utah
Supreme Court in Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 228-229
(Utah 1991). Cowling held that a pooling order cannot be made retroactive to a date
prior to the entry of a spacing order. Id. at 228. A possible exception to that rule was
postulated by dictum in Cowling, supra, in the event of inequitable conduct. Id. at 228.
Thus, whether or not the Board erred in failing to order retroactive pooling is
necessarily a question of fact, or at most, a mixed question of law and fact, that of
whether or not there was inequitable conduct. Respondents believe that the substantial
evidence test described with Issue No. 1 above should also be used to review the factual
finding that there was no inequitable conduct on the part of Respondents. At most,
such a finding is a mixed question of law and fact, or an application of the facts to the
law, subject to the "intermediate" arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard
(also referred to as the "reasonableness and rationality" standard), giving substantial
deference to the Board's findings and conclusions, under § 63-46b-16(4)(h). Morton
Internat'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div'n of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
3.

Did the Board err in its finding that the Wells, for purposes of

imposing a risk penalty under the facts of this case, and for no other purpose,
constitute exploratory wells? (Finding of Fact No. 15).
Standard of Review:

This determination requires special expertise.

The

applicable standard of review of findings in which the agency's special expertise "puts
it in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in
light of the agency's mission" is the intermediate standard of reasonableness and
rationality, giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions. See,
e.g., Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180
(Utah 1996) (issues of highly technical nature concerning wildcat status of wells
remanded for the Board to consider and decide). See also Morton, supra, 814 P.2d at
588, n. 41 (and accompanying citations) and 589, n. 46, 47 and 48 (and accompanying
citations); Savage, supra, 811 P.2d at 667-68; Hurley, supra.
4.

Did the Board err in ruling that Petitioner and his Landowners were

nonconsenting owners and err by imposing a nonconsent penalty upon Petitioner?
Standard of Review:

The determination of whether Petitioner and the

Landowners were nonconsenting owners is a finding which the agency's expertise "puts
it in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances in light of the
agency's mission," and should be reviewed under the standard described in connection
with Issue No. 3 above, giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and
conclusions.
5,

Did the Board abuse its discretion in determining the terms and

conditions of the pooling order, and were those terms and conditions just and
reasonable as required under the Conservation Act?

Standard of Review: Whether the Board abused its discretion is reviewed under
the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard (reasonableness and
rationality), giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions.
Whether the terms and conditions of the pooling order are just and reasonable is also
determined under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard
(reasonableness and rationality), giving deference to the Board's findings and
conclusions, as in Sam Oil, supra, and Bennion v. ANR Production Co., supra; Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner seeks review of a pooling order (the "Pooling Order"), attached to the
Petitioner's Brief as Appendix 3, issued by the Board under the provisions of the
Conservation Act. Even though the spacing order on which the Pooling Order was
based (the "Spacing Order") was not entered until January 26, 2000, the Petitioner
seeks to have the Pooling Order made retroactive to predate the Spacing Order and be
effective as of the dates of first production of the Wells, being November 7, 1995 (for
the 5-94 Well) and December 1998 (for the 5-266 Well). In addition, the Petitioner
seeks a review of the Pooling Order to the extent that it finds that the Petitioner and the
Landowners were nonconsenting owners and imposes a nonconsent penalty on the
interest of Petitioner.
In October of 1999, Petitioner filed a Request for Agency Action with the Board

to establish 160-acre drilling units around each of the Wells pursuant to the
Conservation Act. (R. 2-9.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board issued the
Spacing Order, Cause No. 243-3, effective January 26, 2000, establishing a 160-acre
drilling unit around each of the Wells. (R. 223-234.) The Board also specifically
denied Petitioner's request to make spacing effective as of the dates of first production
(R. 230) and Petitioner did not appeal that order of the Board.
On June 12, 2000, after unsuccessful negotiations to establish voluntary pooling,
Petitioner filed a Request for Agency Action pursuant to the pooling provisions of the
Conservation Act (Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5), requesting the Board to pool the
interests in the drilling units established by the Spacing Order.

(R. 238-248.)

Following an evidentiary hearing on August 23, 2000, the Board issued the Pooling
Order, Cause No. 243-5. (R. 555.)
The Board pooled all interests within each of the drilling units containing the
Wells. (R. 558.) The Board made the Pooling Order effective as of the date of the
Spacing Order and denied Petitioner's request that pooling be made effective as of the
dates of first production from the Wells. (R. 564.) The Board also imposed upon the
Petitioner a nonconsent penalty of 225 % of his share of the costs of drilling the wells
chargeable against his share of production commencing after the effective date of the
Spacing Order. (R. 565.)
On October 27, 2000, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review of the Pooling

Order contending that the Board erred (1) by failing to make pooling effective as of the
dates of first production from the Wells; (2) by declaring him and the Landowners to be
nonconsenting owners; and (3) by imposing upon him a 225% nonconsent penalty
charged against his share of production after the effective date of the Spacing Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Drunkards Wash Unit.

The DW Unit was approved effective December 28, 1990 as a Federal
exploratory unit and is administered by the Utah State Office of the United States
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). The DW Unit, after six expansions and one
contraction, now covers 89,415.25 acres in Carbon and Emery Counties.

The

governing Unit Agreement is a voluntary agreement for the development of a coalbed
methane gas reservoir that effectively pools all of the interests of those owners and
lessees who join it. It was, at all times relevant to this appeal, ratified by over ninety
(90%) percent of the mineral owners within the area encompassed by the DW Unit and
their lessees.

The DW Unit covers oil and gas producible from all formations,

including coalbed methane producible from the Ferron formation.

The lands

encompassing Petitioner's interests have, since the initial unit formation in 1990, been
included within the physical boundaries of the DW Unit. (R. 103.)
As required under Federal regulations governing Federal exploratory unit
formation and operations (see 43C.F.R. §3181.3, attached hereto as Addendum 1), all

of the uncommitted owners in the captioned lands were provided opportunities to join
the DW Unit.

In addition, and beyond the minimum requirements, Respondents,

through River Gas as operator of the DW Unit,1 offered to lease all of the uncommitted
owners' interests, including the Landowners. While many owners did join or lease, the
Landowners refused, either affirmatively or by their non-responsiveness, to either lease
their interest or otherwise join the DW Unit. A significant portion of the interests held
within the DW Unit were those of the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration ("SITLA"). (R. 216; 573; Tr. 150.)2 SITLA was among the
owners opting to include their interests in the DW Unit and participate therein. Id.
B.

Attempts To Have The Landowners Lease Or Join The DW
Unit.

With respect to the Landowners, River Gas had been informed and assured that
LaRue Layne represented all of them, and that all dealings and offers concerning the
property were to go through her. (R. 573; Tr. 135.) Accordingly, Mrs. Layne was
contacted and sent offers to lease the property in January 1991 as well as in June 1991.
(R. 352-357; Record at 573; Tr. 129-132.) In spite of those two separate offers to
lease and a number of telephone conversations with her (R. 352; 358-359), Mrs. Layne
1

The DW Unit was originally operated by River Gas of Utah, Inc. ("RGU"), which
was succeeded by River Gas Corporation ("RGC") and Phillips Petroleum Company
through merger. At all times relevant to this appeal, the unit was operated by RGU or
RGC (collectively hereafter "River Gas"), for and on behalf of Respondents River Gas
Corporation, Texaco Exploration and Production Inc., and Dominion Resources Utah, Inc.
2
References to the August 23, 2000 hearing transcript are to transcript page numbers.
O

did not respond. (R. 573; Tr. 131-132) After Mrs. Layne did not respond to offers to
lease her property, she was again contacted in November 1991 with a formal invitation
to allow her the opportunity to commit the Landowners' interest to the DW Unit.3 (R.
360-364; Record at 573; Tr. 133.) That invitation asked her to consider joining the
unit and offered to answer any questions she might have concerning the offer. Id. As
with the offers to lease, Mrs. Layne did not respond to the November 1991 offer to join
the DW Unit. (R. 573; Tr. 135.)
Following those efforts, River Gas contacted Mrs. Layne by telephone,
negotiated a lease, sent her a proposed lease in duplicate on September 14, 1993 with a
bank draft, and disclosed to her its plans to have 33 wells producing by the end of
1993. (R. 365.) Mrs. Layne asked some questions of River Gas' representative, which
were answered on October 18, 1993 (R. 366), and the lease negotiations remained
open. The offer was reiterated and the unit operations further explained by River Gas
by letter dated November 3, 1993. (R. 367; Record at 573; Tr. 138-141.) When Mrs.
Layne did not respond to those offers and reiterations of offers to lease, yet another
offer was sent to her, following additional telephone conversations.

River Gas'

representative sent a letter dated January 31, 1995 to Mrs. Layne offering another
opportunity to lease and answering questions. (R. 368; Record at 573; Tr. 141.) After
3

The invitation was sent to her by certified mail and was received in November 1991,
and was the standard letter that was sent to all parties that owned an interest in the DW
Unit area. (R. 573; Tr. 134.) A copy of the invitation that was sent to Mrs. Layne,
together with the returned receipt evidencing delivery, are included at R. 360-364.

answering a few questions that were asked in another telephone conversation (R. 370),
several more telephone conversations occurred (R. 371-372) concerning various topics
relating to rights-of-way and leasing, and another letter was sent on March 28, 1995
notifying Mrs. Layne of the locations of wells that were planned to be drilled in the
same section of land as her property interests. (R. 374-375; Record at 573; Tr. 142.)
None of the above offers, including letters, telephone conversations and
notifications of plans to drill in the vicinity of the Landowners' property interests
produced any results. Nevertheless, River Gas thereafter sent yet another offer to lease
or commit the working interest of the Landowners to the DW Unit, by certified letter
dated July 20, 1995. (R. 376; Record at 573; Tr. 149-151.) This letter, sent four
months before drilling the 5-94 well, was sent not only to Mrs. Layne, but to all the
Landowners, and stated clearly [summarizing]:
1.

That the Landowners' interests were within the DW Unit;

2.

That other owners of the same tracts in which the Landowners held an
interest had been offered a lease;

3.

That in the letter River Gas was providing them yet another opportunity to
elect to join the DW Unit on a working interest basis or lease their
interests, as well as the proposed terms of such lease;

4.

That if the Landowners chose to lease, River Gas would allow them to
reap the benefits of unit production without bearing any pre-production
expenses;

5.

The terms of the conditions, in reasonable detail, of the unit operating
agreement (a copy of which was attached to the letter) that would apply in
the event they elected to join the DW Unit; and

6.

That if no response was sent back to River Gas within 30 days, River Gas
would deem that they declined to lease or commit to the unit.

Notably, in the July 20, 1995 letters, River Gas strongly suggested that the Landowners
"read the enclosed documents carefully and, if deemed necessary, seek advice of
qualified legal counsel/9 (R. 378.)
Those July 20, 1995 letters sent to all Landowners offered participation in the
DW Unit as working interest owners on the same terms as any other working interest
owners in their respective positions (including the sharing of costs and revenues under
the unitization provisions). (R. 376-378.) Consequently, all of the Landowners knew
or should have known of the plans of River Gas, as DW Unit operator, to drill on the
captioned lands. No Landowner consented in advance to the drilling of any of the wells
or agreed to bear his proportionate share of the cost thereof. (R. 573; Tr. 151; 159160.)
In each and every correspondence to them, River Gas invited the Landowners to
contact it with any questions. Although questions were asked by them, the Landowners
simply failed to respond to the offers. At no time did the Landowners ever express any
objections to River Gas' offers or offer any counterproposals. See generally, Record at
573; Transcript 128-162.
Two of the Landowners, Terry Olsen and Rita Beck, were present and available
to testify in the Board proceedings below. (R. 573; Tr. 5.) However, Petitioner chose

not to call either of them to offer any evidence that might controvert any of the Board's
factual findings.

{See e.g., Record at 573; Tr. 86-89.) Thus, all of the evidence

concerning the offers, proposals, telephone conversations, correspondence, certified
letters, etc. communicated to the Landowners as presented at the Board hearing is
entirely uncontroverted on the Record.
C.

Well History And Associated Risks

River Gas, as DW Unit operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-94 Well
pursuant to the unit operating agreement, and in accordance with the description of unit
operations as explained in the correspondence to the Landowners, on Lot 4 (the
NW^NWVi) of Section 5 on September 11, 1995. It was completed it as a coalbed
methane well in the Ferron formation on November 7, 1995. In addition, River Gas,
as DW Unit operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-266 Well pursuant to the unit
operating agreement, and in accordance with the description of unit operations as
explained in advance in further correspondence and conversations with various of the
Landowners (R. 573; Tr. 157-160), on the SW!4NE!4 of Section 5 on November 12,
1998. It was completed it as a coalbed methane well in the Ferron formation on
December 23, 1998. (R. 310.) Both wells are located on leaseholds owned solely by
Respondents.

(R. 308-310.)

Prior to drilling, the locations of both wells were

authorized by virtue of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining's (the "Division's")
approval of applications for permit to drill and were ratified by the Board's subsequent

order entered in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. (R. 310.) Petitioner also did not
seek appeal of that order.
Respondents presented expert testimony of Mr. Mike Farrens at the Board
hearing which established the numerous risks associated with drilling the two Wells.
First, the thickness of the coal seam in the area, at the edge of the Ferron formation,
and corresponding concerns about potential reserves and production, were of significant
concern; it was not clear whether the Wells would hit any economic zone to yield
profitable production. (R. 573; Tr. 196-197; 199; 203-208.) Second, the costs and
difficulties associated with water disposal and whether or not the potentially large
quantity of water, anticipated to contain high levels of total dissolved solids, would be
able to be disposed with the Price Water Improvement District, were also of great
concern. (R. 573; Tr. 184-185; 198-202.) Third, costs and economic justification for
installing gas lines and gathering systems and adequate compressing capacity were of
significant concern. (R. 573; Tr. 185; 192-195.) Fourth, the appropriate acreage that
would be drained by a well in that area was also of concern, since the 160-acre spacing
had also been of concern elsewhere in the DW Unit, and since 160-acre spacing was
somewhat arbitrarily used for environmental reasons (to keep the number of wells
drilled and the disturbance at a minimum in certain sensitive areas) under the
Environmental Impact Statement under which the drilling in the DW Unit was
evaluated. (R. 573; Tr. 189-190.)

D.

Petitioner's Acquisition Of Leases From The Landowners,

On June 21, 1999, Petitioner acquired leases from the Landowners on terms no
more favorable than River Gas had previously offered, except for a clause which
prohibits Petitioner's joinder of the leases to the DW Unit without the Landowners'
express consent. (R. 311.) In sworn testimony, Petitioner admitted he made no inquiry
of River Gas regarding the status of the 5-94 and 5-266 Wells and the Landowner
interests prior to his acquisition of the leases, even though he was aware that the
captioned lands were within the physical boundaries of the DW Unit, and was also
aware of the existence of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells and River Gas' operation of them
pursuant to the unit agreement. (R. 573; Tr. 96.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner and his landowners had numerous opportunities to participate in the
drilling of the Wells, or to drill their own wells, or to seek a spacing order at any
"earlier time." See e.g., Cowling, 830 P.2d at 222. Such opportunities included
numerous offers to lease or join the DW Unit that were forwarded to the Landowners
by Respondents on many occasions. The good faith offers of participation in the DW
Unit or to lease their interests satisfied any and all requirements incumbent upon
Respondents under the Conservation Act or the common law. Respondents engaged in
no "inequitable conduct" and had no duty to seek spacing or otherwise protect any
correlative rights of Landowners and Petitioner.

Under the law of capture, the

Conservation Act, and Utah case law interpreting the same, the Board acted properly
under the facts of this case in ordering pooling effective as of the date of the Spacing
Order and not prior thereto.
The Board order finding that the Landowners and the Petitioner were
nonconsenting owners was entirely proper due to the Landowners' failure to consent to
drilling or otherwise respond to good faith offers to join the DW Unit or to lease their
interests. The conferring of nonconsenting owner status on the Petitioner was also
proper since he stands in the shoes of the Landowners as their lessee. In addition, the
Board order that the drilling of the Wells involved "moderate risk" was supported by
substantial evidence and the imposition of the 225% nonconsent penalty was
appropriate under the circumstances and supported by substantial evidence.
ARGUMENT

I.

UTAH HAS ADOPTED THE RULE THAT POOLING
CANNOT BE MADE RETROACTIVE TO A TIME PRIOR
TO THE DATE OF A SPACING ORDER.

A.

The Law Of Capture In Utah,

The court in Cowling succinctly expressed the essence of the law of capture:
Under the common law of capture, a landowner could drill
for oil or gas on its land wherever and with as many wells as
the landowner thought appropriate. If oil or gas were
found, the landowner would not be liable to adjacent
landowners whose lands were also drained, even if the
producing well were drilled next to the adjoining
landowner's boundary. Moreover, the producing landowner
would be entitled to produce as much oil or gas as possible,

even though the ultimate recovery of oil or gas from the
reservoir was diminished. Thus, under the law of capture, a
landowner incurred no liability for causing oil or gas to
migrate across property boundaries and was not required to
compensate adjoining landowners for draining oil and gas
from their lands.
830 P.2d at 224 [citations omitted]. The Cowling court also explained the basis for the
emergence of the Conservation Act:
This [law of capture] produced results that were unfair to
many landowners and development practices that were
uneconomical or wasteful for all. Thus, it encouraged the
drilling of more wells than necessary to drain a field, and it
permitted techniques and rates of production that augmented
the profits of the property owner whose land was producing,
but wasted the resources of the field as a whole.
Id. (quoting Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137
(Utah 1983)). The court then observed:
In 1955, the Legislature enacted the Utah Oil and Gas
Conservation Act. That Act modified the law of capture and
established the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to
regulate the development and production of oil and gas in
the state for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting
correlative rights. The Act was amended and superseded by
the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1983.
Id. at 224-225.
B.

Cowling Reinforces The Law Of Capture And The Adjoining
Landowner's Responsibility To Protect His Own Interests.

Cowling firmly announced the rule that a pooling order cannot be made
retroactive to a time prior to the date of a spacing order. 830 P.2d at 228-229. The

court illuminated the interface between the law of capture and the Conservation Act,
stating that the Conservation Act's objectives (to prevent waste, provide for
development, maximize recovery, and protect the correlative rights of all owners) are
"significantly interrelated" to the law of capture. Cowling held that the law of capture
is abrogated only to the extent that it conflicts with the Conservation Act. Id. at 225.4
The court examined the anatomy of the term "correlative rights." Referring to
its definition, "the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable
share of the oil and gas in a pool without waste," the court reasoned that "the statute
makes individual correlative rights dependent upon the overriding objective of obtaining
the greatest production possible from the pool, and not from any particular well or
property." Id. at 224 (emphases added). The court explained that a correlative right is
nothing more than an "opportunity" to produce a "just and equitable share" of oil and
gas "without waste," and that correlative rights do not confer a mineral interest owner
with an "absolute right to all the oil or gas under one's land." Id.
The court identified various "opportunities" afforded a landowner to eliminate
any negative effects of the law of capture prior to entry of a spacing order:
Rule C-3(e) expressly allows an adjoining interest owner to
petition the Board for an exception location. An adjoining
mineral estate owner who is prevented from drilling a well
may also seek to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement to
protect that interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5).
4

See description in Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 572, n. 3
(Utah 1993).
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830 P.2d at 228. In other words, in addition to leasing {see Cowling at 226), a
landowner can drill his or her own well (including seeking an exception location if
necessary) or negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement. A Federal exploratory unit
agreement, such as the DW Unit Agreement, clearly constitutes such an agreement.
Thus, Cowling made clear there are numerous alternatives available to an owner
to take action to establish and protect his interest prior to the entry of a spacing order,
including voluntarily joining a unit agreement. The court held that an owner's failure
to take any such action constitutes a waiver of that interest until the spacing order is
established. Id. at 228; see also Adkins v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d
880, 884 (Utah 1996).
The court also charted the boundaries of spacing and pooling and examined the
concept of retroactivity in relation thereto. It left immovable its pronouncement that the
"mechanism for defining correlative rights in a pool of oil or gas is a spacing order."
Id. at 227. The court pronounced that § 40-6-6(5) authorizes pooling orders to be
entered only with respect to "established drilling units" (areas where a spacing order is
in effect), and that the statutory scheme itself does not contemplate the result that a
pooling order would be made retroactive prior to the date of the spacing order. Id.5

5

The court differentiated Bennion v. Bd of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1983), decided under the previous version of the statute. The court stated that Bennion
does not require pooling to be retroactive to first production, and limited it to its facts:
18

Cowling makes clear that the law of capture is the law that governs in Utah,
except as specifically modified by the Conservation Act.

Specifically, Cowling

demonstrates that until a spacing order is entered, the Conservation Act has no bearing
on the activities and interests of operators vis-a-vis adjacent landowners and only the
law of capture applies, and that owners who fail to avail themselves of the
"opportunity" presented to them in the form of their correlative rights through
(1) leasing; (2) voluntarily pooling or unitization, (3) drilling their own well; or
(4) petitioning the Board for spacing, waive those rights under the law of capture until
such time as a spacing order applies.6 Cowling instructs that to place any duty on an
operator to seek spacing flies in the face of the law of capture, and that to hold
otherwise would emasculate the law of capture and extend the reach of the
Conservation Act much further back than the legislature intended, severely impacting
its clearly enunciated policies.
C.

Neither The Conservation Act Nor Case Law Imposes A Duty
On A Unit Operator To Seek Spacing,

A reading of the Conservation Act and the substantial body of case law on the
issue suggest that an operator indeed has no duty to seek spacing, and that the law of
capture is alive and well even beyond the stage of wildcat or exploratory wells. Yet,
Bennion involved a pooling order made effective as of the date of production where the
spacing order itself preceded the date of first production.
6
For a thorough and insightful analysis of the history of the law of capture and
Cowling's effect on it in conjunction with the provisions of the Conservation Act, see
Richards, et al., Oil and Gas Conservation in Utah After Cowling: The Law of Capture
Receives a New Lease on Life, 14 J. En. Nat'l Res. & Env. Law 1 (1994).

Petitioner argues that the Conservation Act imposes a duty on a unit operator to seek
spacing. Petitioner fails to cite any case law or show how an operator is obligated to
seek spacing, and particularly how a unit operator should seek spacing from the Board
in light of the Federal requirements that are imposed upon the establishment of a unit in
43 C.F.R. Subpart § 3181 (attached hereto as Addendum 1), and in light of the
obligations under an approved unit agreement relating to the protection of the
correlative rights of all participants of the Federal unit.7
acknowledged in Cowling, there is no such duty.

Indeed, as effectively

See discussion to that effect in

Richards, et al., supra note 5, at 32, note 177.
Petitioner's position is made more untenable by the relevant case law, including
the holding in Cowling as well as the case of Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra,
note 4. In that case, the court placed no duty upon the Board or upon the operator to
"protect" Bennion's correlative rights, seek a pooling order, or otherwise. The court
left it completely up to Bennion to protect himself; he would have to come back in a
subsequent proceeding and specifically ask for a pooling order. Even where a spacing
order was in place as in Bennion, the court still held that an adjoining landowner would

7

Under these circumstances, the correlative rights of any noncommitted owners
would be more than amply protected by joining the unit. See discussion in III below.
Petitioner's argument also ignores the overlying fact that a Federal unit, offering all of
the protections and benefits to any interested owners that a Board spacing and pooling
could offer if simply joined, was already present in this case, unlike the other Utah
cases (including Cowling). The existence of the Federal unit effectively pre-empted any
urgent necessity to seek "additional" spacing and makes the present action an even
stronger case for denying retroactive pooling.

himself have to seek a pooling order, rather than have the operator or even the Board
on its own motion do so, before being entitled to a share of the proceeds of any
production. The court strictly construed the Conservation Act and held that a request
for an accounting under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 would not be construed as a request
for pooling, and the court made no mention about any duty of an operator to do
anything to protect the adjoining landowner's correlative rights, even following a
request for an accounting on an established drilling unit. Thus, Petitioner's argument
herein that Respondents had a duty to seek spacing at an earlier time is totally
misplaced.
As case law support, Petitioner can only cite dicta in Cowling stating that "the
statutory scheme contemplates prompt action in the prosecution of a petition for a
spacing order." 830 P.2d at 228. Petitioner attempts to show the court that such
language squarely places a duty on an operator to expeditiously seek a spacing order.
However, Petitioner's resort to the dicta in Cowling to reach that result misreads the
holding in Cowling itself and ignores the much larger body of Utah cases (and cases
from other jurisdictions) that hold there is no such duty. See, e.g., Cowling, 830 P.2d
at 227, Richards, et aL, supra, note 6, at 30-32. Those cases in fact place a duty
squarely on the landowners to protect themselves or be subject to a waiver, even if a
spacing order {e.g., Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra) is in place. Scholars have
reasoned that the Cowling dicta is "difficult to square" with its holding that the

Conservation Act does not abrogate the law of capture prior to entry of a spacing order.
See Richards, et aL, supra note 6, at 30-32. In short, Cowling does not support the
proposition that the operator has such a duty; on the contrary it stands for the
conclusion that no such duty exists. Id.
D.

The Utah Statute And Case Law Make Clear That Correlative
Rights Are To Be Protected Through Action By The
Landowners, Not By Retroactive Pooling,

Contrary to Petitioner's arguments that retroactive pooling is required to insure
that Petitioner receives his just and equitable share of production, Utah case law and the
Conservation Act place that responsibility (or, more precisely, that "opportunity")
squarely on the shoulders of the adjoining property owners. Cowling, supra.; Bennion
v. ANR, supra; Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., supra; Adkins, supra. As stated
by the court, "the utilization of the 'opportunity' depends upon the individual
landowner." Adkins, supra,, 926 P.2d at 883. The Utah courts have appropriately and
consistently found that it is improper and inequitable for an adjoining landowner or
lessee thereof to attempt to "ride down a well." They simply must come forward to
protect themselves. Id. In particular, Cowling makes clear that adjoining landowners
should drill their own wells or actively seek to negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement,
petition the Board for a spacing order, or, failing being able to enter into a voluntary
pooling agreement, should affirmatively pursue a forced pooling order from the Board
in order to take advantage of their correlative rights opportunity. 830 P.2d at 222; 226-

227.8

E.

The Landowners And The Petitioner Have Every Right And
Opportunity To Seek Spacing And Pooling At Any Time, And
Are In As Good A Position As The Respondents To Do So,

Adjacent landowners can seek their own financing and drill their own well where
no spacing order has been entered. They can take advantage of the opportunity they
have to lease, obtain partners, and do anything that an "operator" can do — including
being an operator themselves at any time. The statute allows both an operator and any
interested landowner the opportunity to seek spacing and pooling at any time. See Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-6 and 6.5. The Landowners were in as good a position (or even
better, since they had no obligations to the unit participants under the unit operating
agreement) as Respondents to seek spacing.
II.

A POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THE POOLING ORDER
RULE IN COWLING DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.

A.

Case Law Concerning Inequitable Conduct.

The Cowling court only referenced two cases from other jurisdictions sustaining

8

Perhaps as telling as any of the pronouncements in Cowling or Bennion v. Graham
Resources are Petitioner's own acknowledgments in his Response to Objection of River
Gas in Cause No. 243-3, R. 206-207:
"Petitioner is entitled to participate in the existing two wells by
first establishing drilling and spacing units to determine his
correlative rights and then paying his proportionate share of well
costs under a mutually agreeable pooling agreement with
Respondents or under a pooling order from the Board."
Petitioner makes clear in that statement his understanding that he must come forth and
establish his correlative rights through spacing and thereafter enter into a pooling
agreement or obtain a pooling order from the Board, and then pay his proportionate
share and any other amounts pursuant to the agreement or Board order.
23

retroactive pooling orders.

Insofar as pertinent here,9 the case of In re Farmers

Irrigation District, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972) was the only case referencing a
possible "inequitable conduct" exception to the pooling order rule.10 A reading of the
Cowling court's treatment of Farmers Irrigation and of Farmers Irrigation itself shows
that it is clearly distinguishable from the present case and actually provides direct
support for the Board's order in this case.
The Cowling court and Farmers Irrigation both began their analyses by
recognizing the inequity that would be caused by a retroactive pooling order allowing
an "adjoining owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of drilling operations
without asking for a pooling agreement...." 830 P.2d at 227 (quoting 194 N.W.2d at
792). Thus, both cases recognized the looming inequity that would result when an
adjoining landowner attempts to "ride down a well."
Farmers Irrigation, in fact, spends considerable time addressing the inequity of
"riding down a well":
There is ordinarily no good reason why an adjoining owner
should not ask for a voluntary pooling agreement at the time
his neighbor starts to drill and thereby share in the expense,
9

The first case was from North Dakota, decided under a statute unlike Utah's, and
was distinguished entirely on that basis. The statute in North Dakota established a
procedure for and required the entry of a temporary spacing order within thirty days of
the completion of a well. See 830 P.2d at 227, citing Texaco Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n., 448 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D. 1989).
10
Farmers Irrigation was also cited by Petitioner and amicus National Association of
Royalty Owners ("NARO") as the only case of which they are aware that sustains a
retroactive pooling order.
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as well as in production, whether or not the well proves
successful. The statutes clearly intend that rights shall be
resolved upon an equitable basis. To permit an adjoining
owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of
drilling operations without asking for a pooling agreement
would place the entire risk and the entire expense upon the
party drilling in the event of an unsuccessful operation.
This would ordinarily be inequitable and not justify a
retroactive order. Section 57-909, RRS, 1943, contemplates
than when an adjoining owner fails to enter into a voluntary
pooling agreement, a spacing and pooling order may be
entered on the application of any interested party. The
drilling party may recover the share of the expense allocated
to the adjoining owner by deducting it from the adjoining
owner's share of the oil or gas produced. This enhances the
risk taken by the drilling party who may encounter a dry
well and is a factor which must also be considered in
weighing equities.
194 N.W.2d at 792 (emphasis added).
While both Cowling and Farmers Irrigation viewed as inequitable an adjoining
owner's delay in asking for a pooling agreement, and Cowling even stated that such a
delay constituted a waiver of an adjoining landowner's correlative rights, the facts are
several shades darker in the present case. Beyond mere delay in making a claim, the
Landowners here have placed Respondents in an even more difficult position from an
equity point of view by flatly refusing (or not responding to) reasonable good faith
offers and sitting back and awaiting the outcome of the drilling. Worse yet, Petitioner
entered upon the scene seeking to reap the benefits of Respondents' risk and
investment, well after the fact of the establishment of production. Petitioner has no
capital at risk, but is an opportunist seeking to reach back in time to improperly extract

proceeds that he had no part in generating. Rewarding Petitioner in that manner would
offend the major policies and intent of the Conservation Act and would produce an
outcome that the legislature specifically intended to preclude. Under the facts of this
case, both Cowling and Farmers Irrigation actually constitute authority to support the
Board's Pooling Order, rather than otherwise.11
B.

"Obvious Delaying Tactics."

The Cowling court observed, however, that Farmers Irrigation had sustained a
pooling order retroactive to a date prior to a spacing order due to the operator's
"obvious delaying tactics."

830 P.2d at 227.

It further observed that the Utah

statutory scheme allows the Board to enter a pooling order on terms that are "just and
reasonable."

The court went on to ascribe to the Board the power to "make

appropriate adjustments as to the date the pooling order is effective." It stated:
That is, a pooling order may be made effective prior to the
entry of a spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by
the operator in pursuing a petition for a spacing order.
Id. at 228. Note the court's use of the discretionary word "may" as opposed to the
mandatory word "shall."

11

The Landowners and the Petitioner in the present case have had at all times the
same opportunity as provided in the Nebraska statute summarized in Farmers Irrigation
to request that the agency order spacing and pooling at any time. See §§ 40-6-6(5) and
40-6-6.5. The language quoted above in Farmers Irrigation plainly states that it would
be inequitable to allow a retroactive pooling order in favor of an adjoining owner who
has that opportunity and fails to take advantage of it. 194 N.W.2d at 792. Cowling
clearly explained such inaction under Utah law would be a waiver of correlative rights.
830 P.2d at 228.

Having enumerated through this dictum a possible issue for future cases, the
Cowling court could offer no more guidance on the subject, since the court specifically
found there was no inequitable conduct exhibited in that case.12 Consequently, nothing
in the facts or the holding in Cowling supports Petitioner's position in this case, and
only one case from other jurisdictions (Farmers Irrigation) involving inequitable
conduct is known. Against the backdrop stands the clearly-stated pooling order rule as
well as the body of case law in a number of jurisdictions, including Utah, that upholds
that rule; namely, that pooling may not be made retroactive prior to the corresponding
spacing order, and the responsibility is squarely on a landowner or lessee to take action
to protect his interest or be subject to a waiver. See Cowling, 830 P.2d at 227, and the
cases cited thereat; Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra; Adkins, supra.13
A realization that the facts of Farmers Irrigation contrast starkly with those of
the present case should help resolve of this matter. In Farmers Irrigation, the adjoining
landowner gave the operator "early notice" (194 N.W. 2d at 792) of its claim of an
interest and its correlative rights within three months of commencement of production,
and demanded a share of that production. Rather than negotiate or attempt in good
faith to reach a solution, the operator disputed the adjoining landowner's ownership and
12

It therefore reiterated the "pooling order rule" and held that the Board erred as a
matter of law requiring that the pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first
production.
3
In nearly 30 years, it appears that no other state court has seen fit to follow the
ruling of Farmers Irrigation. Three of the seven Nebraska Supreme Court Justices
dissented from the opinion, and the very strongly worded dissenting opinion may
explain a number of reasons why the case has not received a favorable acceptance.

instituted protracted litigation which took over four years to conclude. Such were the
"obvious delaying tactics" that the court disdained.14

194 N.W.2d at 789. More

particularly, Farmers Irrigation really turned on the combination of those "delaying
tactics" together with the promptness of the adjoining landowner in making a claim.
194 N.W.2d at 792. Even then, the court did not see fit to make the pooling order
retroactive to the date of first production, but rather, to the date that the non-operator
first came forward to protect his interest. Id. Farmers Irrigation itself, then, is not a
case of retroactive pooling.
Farmers Irrigation was a case in which no equities ran in favor of the operator,
but rather all of the equities ran in favor of the adjoining landowner. Given the strong
three-justice dissent, if the landowner had waited longer to make a claim, it is plausible
that the pooling order would have been made effective as of such later time, as is
essentially the case here. Farmers Irrigation is thus a case that affirmatively supports
the Respondents in this case and not the Petitioner, since the Board below also ordered
pooling effective as of the date Petitioner stepped forward and obtained a spacing order,
and not before.

Farmers Irrigation in fact instructs that such an order should be

upheld.

14

Thus, the "obvious delaying tactics" had nothing to do with the operator delaying an
application for a spacing order, but rather, with delaying tactics making either party's
application for a spacing order difficult or impossible until the outcome of protracted
litigation instituted by the operator.

C.

The Equities In This Case.

The equities in this case run completely in the opposite direction. Respondent
River Gas invited Petitioner's Landowners on numerous occasions to join the DW Unit
as participants on the same terms and conditions under which numerous other owners
were joining, or to lease their interests, as described in the Statement of Facts above,
beginning four years before drilling. After seeing all of the evidence and hearing all of
the testimony in the administrative proceeding as described in the Statement of Facts
above, the Board specifically found in Findings of Facts Nos. 5 through 11, the
following [summarizing]:
(a)

That the offers and general terms and conditions made by Respondents to
the Landowners were reasonable and in good faith;

(b)

That Respondents relied in good faith on the responses or lack of
responses from the Landowners;

(c)

That the Landowners knew or reasonably should have known on or about
the dates of drilling of each of the Wells, of the drilling of the Wells and
of their various interests or potential interests relating to the same and of
their physical location within the boundaries of the Federal Unit; and

(d)

That the Landowners failed to respond to the reasonable and good faith
offers of Respondents.

These findings have not been controverted by Petitioner in this appeal to any degree.
Respondents did not delay any spacing application or create any obstacle to, or

delay in, any spacing application made by Petitioner.15 Respondents engaged in no
"obvious delaying tactics" as were involved in Farmers Irrigation.
Respondents engaged in no inequitable conduct whatsoever.

In short,

Consequently,

Respondents believe that the possible "inequitable conduct" exception to the pooling
order rule clearly does not apply in the present case.
D.

The Board Did Not Err In Its Factual Findings That
Respondents Dealt In Good Faith And Free Of Inequitable
Conduct.

Petitioner has not challenged any of the Findings of Fact Nos. 5 through 11
described in II.C above, much less marshaled any evidence to show that "despite the
supporting facts...the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Petitioner
has offered no reason why the court should overturn these factual findings.16
The Record in this case is replete with substantial evidence sufficient to uphold
these findings, as shown in the Statement of Facts above.17 The Landowners had every

15

Though Respondents opposed Petitioner's application for a spacing order as initially
filed, based justifiably on the applicability of the Federal DW Unit and the Federal
regulations governing the same, such opposition did not delay the making of the
application nor did it delay the issuance of the Board's spacing order. Neither did
Respondents appeal the Board's spacing order, which could have interposed delay or
otherwise impacted the effectiveness of that order.
16
Although Petitioner argues that a failure to specifically offer an opportunity to
participate in the two wells on a proportionate basis and to present an authorization for
expenditure ("AFE") constitute bases for overturning the Board's order, these
arguments are unavailing and by themselves do not controvert the factual findings of
the Board. See discussion in IV below.
17
The Record, as described above in the Statement of Facts, contains documentation
and testimony concerning the numerous efforts made by the unit operator on behalf of
the Respondents to inform the Landowners of the unit operations, to offer them the
opportunity to join the DW Unit as working interest owners on the same terms as all

opportunity to participate fully in the drilling of the Wells and, even more, in the
operation of the entire DW Unit. As much as the Petitioner and NARO might complain
now that the offers and proposals made several years ago were not as attractive as they
thought they should have been {see Petitioner's Brief at p. 39; NARO's Brief at p. 12),
given that no responses from the Landowners were ever received, such a complaint
lacks any foundation, even in the abstract.

Here, moreover, the context further

obliterates Petitioner's argument: numerous other owners accepted the proposals and
offers of Respondents and the Landowners ultimately leased to Petitioner on no better
terms that Respondents had many times previously offered.

Respondents have

marshaled and summarized in the Statement of Facts above some of the substantial
evidence in the form of documentation, testimony in the transcript, copies of repeated
letters and repeated certified letters, testimony concerning numerous telephone
conversations, evidence of other owners accepting Respondents' proposals (including
SITLA), and other items of evidence. This constitutes more than ample substantial
evidence to adequately support and uphold the Board's findings of fact. Whitear,
supra; Hurley, supra; Grace Drilling, supra; Sam Oil, supra; Bennion v. ANR, supra;
Harken, supra; Zissi, supra.

others, to explain to them the consequences of joining or not joining, to make them
aware of the drilling that would be conducted in the immediate vicinity of their lands,
or, alternatively, to lease or acquire their interests. Respondents also encouraged the
Landowners to seek the advice of competent counsel if they felt they did not understand
the significance of these communications.

III. THE EXISTENCE OF THE FEDERAL UNIT AND THE
EXPLORATORY NATURE OF THE WELLS FURTHER
NEGATE ANY DUTY OF THE OPERATOR TO SEEK
SPACING.
A.

The Existence Of The Federal Unit And The Numerous
Opportunities Afforded To The Landowners To Join The Unit
Vitiate Petitioner's Argument That Their Correlative Rights
Were Not Protected.

Unitization, in the context of a Federal exploratory unit, is the formation of a
unit:
by way of an agreement between owners of leasehold
and overriding royalty or similar interests in oil and
gas leases, including federal oil and gas leases, which
agreement is approved by the United States in line
with authorization and requirements of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 as amended [30 U.S.C. § 181 et
seq.]. The agreement involved is thus to be one for
the joint exploration, development, and operation of
an entire prospectively productive area of oil and/or
gas. This unit area is to be operated as a single entity
without regard to lease boundaries. The objective
sought is to permit unified development and
operation of an entire geological prospect [i.e.
reservoir] so that exploration, drilling and
production can proceed in the most efficient and
economical manner by one operator.
Coffield, "Selected Problems with Federal Exploratory Units," 35 Rocky Mtn. Min. L.
Inst. 13-1, 13-2 through 3 (1985) (emphasis added). Costs are often reduced because
the reservoir can be produced by utilizing the most efficient well spacing (as opposed to
a fixed well) pattern and there is no requirement to drill unnecessary offset wells.
Noted scholars have stated that conservation principals are most effectively

addressed through unitization:
Unitization of reservoirs...strikes directly at the root cause
of the conservation problem. It seeks effectively to
eliminate the multiplicity of competing interests for purposes
of operating a common reservoir, while retaining separate
interest for purposes of sharing equitable common costs and
benefits. It creates a consolidated private interest which
coincides with the public interest in conservation, thus
enlisting the powerful force of profit-motivated private
enterprise in a public cause, while directly by contract
protecting correlative rights. It obviates the necessity for
numerous negative rules and allows well density, the rate of
extraction, the disposition of associated gas, and other
matters relating to conservation to be adapted flexibly to the
circumstances of each reservoir. Unitization is, in short, a
positive instrument of petroleum conservation.18
Of particular significance to this appeal, judicial recognition was accorded to acts of
Congress and Department of Interior regulations as supporting Federal exploratory
unitization as an important conservative measure, preventing waste of natural
resources. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 931-933 (10th Cir.
1954), cert, denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) (involving a Federal exploratory unit in
Utah).

The Board has in fact found that the conservation of oil and gas and the

prevention of waste is accomplished by operations conducted in accordance with the

Wilson, "State Spacing Jurisdiction Over Conservation," Federal Onshore Oil and
Gas Pooling and Unitization II, Paper No. 2 Pages 2-21 and 2-22 (Rocky Mt. Min. L.
Fdn. 1990) (citing McDonald, "Petroleum Conservation in the United States, an
Economic Analysis" 198 (1971)); see also Romanov, "Statutory Unitization:
Significant Legal Issues," Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Paper No. 12,
Page 12-2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1985); see also Kutchins, "The Benefits and
Risks of Federal Onshore Exploratory Units," 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. Law. Inst. 785,
787-788 (Matthew Bender 1983).

DW Unit Agreement (R. 69).
The existence of the DW Unit and the inclusion of the land in question within
that unit vitiates Petitioner's argument that his or the Landowners' correlative rights
were in unprotected status. When the DW Unit was formed, care was taken, pursuant
to Federal regulatory requirements, e.g. 43 C.F.R. § 3181.2 (see Addendum 1), to give
the benefit of the doubt to include all areas, including the lands in question here, that
reasonably should be included in the unit area based on the then known generalized
geologic conditions (R. 573, Tr. 128-140). Under the DW Unit Agreement and Unit
Operating Agreement (as in effect at the time the Landowners were invited to join),
costs and production are allocated on pro-rata acreage basis (R. 118-130; R. 573; Tr.
145). As outlined above, the Landowners were given numerous opportunities to lease
or join the DW Unit and never expressed any objections to those terms. These factors
clearly demonstrate Respondent's good faith to conserve natural resources, prevent
waste and protect correlative rights, the same enunciated objectives of the Conservation
Act (see Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1). Thus, it was entirely appropriate for Respondents
to proceed with development of the captioned lands within the context of the Federal
exploratory unit.19

19

In certain respects, carving out the land in question after the unit participants have
had a long history of investing in unit development and the unit has been structured
based on the total extent of the unit area, could be viewed as inequitable to the
committed unit participants who have paid their fair share of the risks of unit
development from the beginning. See, Cowling, supra; Farmers Irrigation, supra.
1A

Simply put, Respondents did not need to space, and indeed had no duty to space,
since unitization accomplishes the same purposes and is a completely effective
substitute for spacing. The Division acknowledged the formation of a Federal unit as
de facto superceding any spacing (R. 573; Tr. 244). The Board's current rules provide
for the suspension of spacing orders, and suspension of the Board's and Division's well
siting rules, as to lands within a Federal unit, upon petition and hearing. See Utah
Admin. Code Rule R649-2-3 (attached as Addendum 2 hereto) With respect to the
lands in question herein, the Board, following a petition and hearing, entered its Order
in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999, suspending all spacing within the DW Unit area
(R. 60-79). That order was not superceded until the Board's Order entered in Cause
No. 243-3, in which the Board spaced Landowners' land effective January 26, 2000,
but expressly rejected Petitioner's request for retroactive effectiveness. (R. 223-234;
230.) Notably, Petitioner did not appeal either order.
Having made every reasonable effort to encourage the Landowners to join the
unit, explaining to them on numerous occasions the significance of joining (which
would have afforded them the same or better benefits than spacing and pooling), and
having been rebuffed repeatedly by the Landowners, the unit operator had no duty to
drag the Landowners into a spacing proceeding with the Boaid

Having an approved

Federal unit (in which spacing was superceded by a Board order in favor of the
unitization structure), any spacing proceeding brought by Respondents would have been

superfluous.

The applicability of the Federal unit structure doubly negated any

perceived duty of the Respondents to space in the present case.
Petitioner in the alternative asserts it was incumbent upon River Gas to seek
approval of the DW Unit before the Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-7 and
8. As discussed in I.C above, no such duty exists under Cowling. Furthermore, at the
time of its formation and until the Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 199820,
much of the DW Unit area was subject to Federal leaseholds. There is no guarantee the
Federal government would have consented to the Board's jurisdiction to approve a
Federal exploratory unit pursuant to the cited statutes based on preemption. See 30
U.S.C. § 226(m) (attached as Addendum 3 hereto); see also Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas
Company v. United States, 675 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1982). Without the Federal
government's consent, there would be no Federal exploratory unit. As a presumable
consequence, Respondents are unaware of one single Federal exploratory unit that has
come before the Board for approval. In fact, in a recent Board hearing, the BLM
objected to compulsory unitization under Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-7 and 8 in the
context of an exploratory unit, on the alleged basis that compulsory unitization is
contrary to the purposes of such a unit {see BLM letter dated March 26, 2001 filed in
Cause No. 245-2, attached as Addendum 4 hereto).

Public Law No. 105-335 (112 Stat. 3139)

li.

The Board Did Not Err In Finding That The Wells Were
Exploratory Wells; The Correlative Rights Were Not
Ascertainable At The Time These Exploratory Wells Were
Drilled; Respondents Had No Duty To Space On That Basis,

Petitioner argues that the operator had a duty to space in this case since he
believes "the correlative rights were ascertainable at the time the wells were drilled."
Respondents believe this argument suffers from a number of fatal flaws.
The correlative rights were not readily ascertainable at the time the wells were
drilled. The evidence in the Board proceeding below established that the 5-94 and the
5-266 Wells were exploratory wells carrying moderate risk. They are located on or
near the geological limit of the Ferron formation. The Board specifically found that:
At the time they were drilled, wells 5-94 and 5-266 were
located near the edge of known coalbed methane gas field,
and for purposes of imposing a risk penalty under the facts
of this matter, and for no other purpose, wells 5-94 and
5-266 constitute exploratory wells. At the time wells 5-94
and 5-266 were drilled, Respondents incurred a moderate
amount of risk that these wells would not produce sufficient
coalbed methane gas to become production wells.
(R. 561; Finding of Fact No. 15.)
In his brief, Petitioner argues that there were numerous wells in the heart of the
coalbed methane field on a 160-acre spacing. Petitioner appears to believe that the
Wells, to be located at the very edge of the potential outer boundary of the coal seam
where coal thickness and continuity were serious concerns, should also somehow have
been considered, at the time of drilling, to be on a 160-acre drilling pattern. However,

Petitioner has not specifically challenged Finding of Fact No. 15 of the Board to the
effect that the Wells were exploratory wells, and that in drilling the wells Respondents
incurred "a moderate amount of risk" that they would not produce sufficient coalbed
methane gas to become production wells.
Substantial evidence in the Record does exist to support this finding, including
concerns over the thickness and extent of the coal seam in the area (R. 196-197; 203);
concerns over the potential productivity of the Wells (R. 198-200); costs associated
with removal and disposal of ever increasing amounts of water (R. 198; 200-202); and
various other factors relating to geologic conditions, gas compression costs, and rising
production costs in the area of the Wells (R. 192-195; 198-202). It was not at all clear
at the time of drilling whether a 160-acre spacing or some different spacing would be
appropriate, given that the Wells are at the very edge of the Ferron formation coal
seam. (R. 203.) See the summary of Mr. Farrens' testimony in the Statement of Facts
above.
Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in the record to any extent to
specifically address these conditions in the vicinity of the wells and has therefore
wholly failed to contest the Board's specific findings. Rather than attempt to marshal
any such geological evidence relating to the area in the immediate vicinity of the Wells,
Petitioner has instead attempted to divert the court's attention to the fact that there were
numerous wells previously drilled on a 160-acre spacing in other areas of the DW Unit

miles away from his lease. Such facts are only distantly connected to the conditions on
the area in question here.21 The evidence in the record justifying the Board's findings
that the Wells were exploratory, is substantial and constitutes the weight of the evidence
on those matters. The Board's Finding of Fact No. 15 should be upheld; the Board did
not err in this finding; there is substantial evidence in the Record to support it.
Since the Wells were exploratory wells, the potential pool associated therewith
was not readily ascertainable until after an appreciable amount of production history
and experience with the Wells had been obtained. Petitioner in fact acknowledges, on
page 17 of his brief that his correlative rights were not defined at the time of drilling,
implicitly acknowledging that Respondents could have no duty to space in such a case.
This court should not imply an obscure duty on the part of Respondents and thereby
permit Petitioner to benefit from the inequity of "riding down a well," particularly
exploratory wells such as the Wells in this case, or indeed any well in which he has not
agreed in advance to participate.

Petitioner's extrapolation from previously drilled wells in the heart of the Ferron
formation, miles away {see, e.g., the legal descriptions of the locations of the other
areas in the DW Unit that were being spaced, such as R. 28, 36, 37, 48, 49, and 51)
from the area in which the 5-94 and 5-266 Wells were drilled, without any further
technical documentation, does not suffice to demonstrate that the Board erred in finding
that the wells were exploratory. Also, Petitioner neglects to consider in his arguments
that the 160-acre spacing for those wells was mandated by a number of considerations,
the most noteworthy of which were the numerous environmental concerns addressed in
the Environmental Impact Statement for the Price Area Coalbed Methane Record Of
Decision, which somewhat arbitrarily mandated 160-acre spacing in certain areas. (R.
573; Tr. 188-189; 196-197.)

IV.

THE BOARD ACTED PROPERLY IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER
AND
THE
LANDOWNERS
WERE
NONCONSENTING OWNERS AND IN IMPOSING A
NONCONSENT PENALTY ON PETITIONER.

A.

Petitioner's Argument That An Operator Cannot Render An
Adjoining Landowner Nonconsenting Unless Spacing And
Drilling Units Are In Existence Is Without Merit.

The Conservation Act contains a clear, concise definition of the term
"nonconsenting owner":
"Nonconsenting owner" means an owner who after written
notice does not consent in advance to the drilling and
operation of a well or agree to bear his proportionate share
of the costs.
§ 40-6-2(11) (emphasis added). After written notice, any party who merely (1) "does
not consent in advance to the drilling and operation of a well," or (2) "agree to bear his
proportionate share of the costs," by operation of the statute and by definition, is a
nonconsenting owner. In this case, it is clear that the Landowners had written notice in
advance that the Wells would be drilled. It is also clear that none of the Landowners
consented in advance to the drilling and operation of either of the Wells or agreed to
bear his or her proportionate share of the costs. Thus, by statutory definition, they are
nonconsenting owners. The regulation at Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9 also includes as
nonconsenting owners those who receive good faith offers to lease their interests. See
Brief of Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, at pp. 21-27, which is incorporated herein by
reference. Thus, the regulation goes even further in support of Respondents' position

in this case, since the Landowners were offered a lease on numerous occasions on the
sanctions that they ultimately leased to Petitioner.
Nowhere in the statute, or the definition, or the regulation, or elsewhere, is it
required (1) that the owner be offered to participate in a well (as opposed to merely
receiving advance written notice); (2) that he be given notice of what his proportionate
share might be; (3) that he be given notice of the precise location of the well; (4) that
the owner receive in advance an authorization for expenditure ("AFE") covering the
well; (5) that a spacing order or pooling order be established in advance; (6) that
correlative rights be defined in advance; (7) that the well or wells in question be
situated on lands which include lands in close proximity to the to the owner's land;
(8) that such well or wells cannot be drilled in conjunction with numerous proposed
wells in a unit potentially sharing a pool or coalbed methane horizon in common with
property of the owner; (9) that the well in question cannot be part of the operations
under a Federal unit; (10) that he be "sophisticated" or not "absentee"; or (11) any
other of the "requirements" that Petitioner would have the court read into the statute
and the definition. A nonconsenting owner is simply nothing more than a person who,
after written notice, does not consent to the drilling and operation of "a well" or agree
to share costs in "a well" (or agree to a lease as under the regulation), whether or not
through participation in a unit agreement or otherwise.
Petitioner would have this court preclude the Board from conferring

nonconsenting owner status on any person unless a spacing and drilling unit are in
existence for the well or wells in question, the correlative rights of the owner are fullyestablished, and an AFE is sent. Consider the following suggestion propounded by
Petitioner:
No common pool or correlative rights in the land
surrounding the wells had been defined as a matter of State
law. Whether Mr. Hagerty's (Petitioner's) landowners were
"owners" within the "pools" drained by the wells had not
been determined. Accordingly, there was no legal basis
under the Conservation Act for the Board's decision that
Mr. Hagerty's landowners were "nonconsenting" at the time
the wells were drilled and the Board erred as a matter of law
in imposing a nonconsent penalty.
Petitioner's Brief at p. 35 (emphasis added).
Petitioner's position is that there would be "no legal basis" for the imposition of
a nonconsent penalty on an owner who does not consent unless all the rights are defined
in advance. Petitioner argues that for there to be an "owner," the "pool" must be
defined, along with all of the correlative rights, before any drilling capable of being
"consented to" can occur. In the absence of such a definition of correlative rights,
under Petitioner's position, no nonconsent penalty could ever be imposed.
If the court followed Petitioner's position, it would emasculate the major policy
considerations of the Conservation Act, and one would wonder how many potential
wells would ever be drilled. Petitioner would overturn long-standing decisions of this
court under the Conservation Act and would administer a crippling blow to oil and gas

development in the State. Petitioner's argument is totally misplaced and should not be
adopted by this court.22
In fact, Petitioner's argument puts the proverbial cart before the horse. A
spacing order can only be sought based on data generated by a well that is already
drilled on or near the lands sought to be spaced. See Cowling, at 226.

Under

Petitioner's theory, there could never be a "nonconsenting owner" in such a well. This
clearly is not what the Legislature intended in the Conservation Act or the court in its
holding in Cowling.
R

The Landowners Had Notice In Advance Concerning The
Drilling Of The Wells And The Opportunity To Participate In
The Wells Within The Meaning Of And In Compliance With
The Conservation Act.

As described above in Section I and II.C, Findings of Fact Nos. 5 through 11
relating to the good faith offers and actions of Respondents are supported by substantial
evidence in the Record, must be given deference by the court, and Petitioner has failed
in his burden to marshal the evidence to overturn them.

Rather than attempt to

Moreover, Petitioner has it backwards. The more the uncertainty and risk, the
higher the appropriate nonconsent penalty should be. Petitioner's argument ignores the
simple fact that if a well is drilled in an unknown area or before correlative rights are
defined, even greater risks are taken by the operator, both operationally and
geologically with respect to percentages of ownership of the potential pool. The
Conservation Act encourages production and fosters development and therefore its
policy of rewarding risk is appropriate. If, after drilling and some history of
production, it is determined that a nonconsenting owner's land does not extend over a
discovered pool, he pays no nonconsent penalty since he has no rights in the pool. No
harm has been done. If on the other hand, his land is found to cover an area in the
pool, he has been greatly benefited by the risk taken by the operator, for which it is
quite proper that the operator be rewarded. Both parties win.

controvert these findings, Petitioner argues that somehow the language of Bennion v.
ANR, supra, 819 P.2d at 348, and Sam Oil, supra, 817 P.2d at 304, note 4, makes it
clear that a nonconsent penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed unless the mineral
owner is "given the opportunity to elect to participate in the drilling," and that such
opportunity must be on a well-by-well basis. Petitioner argues that no such opportunity
was ever "given."
Petitioner misconstrues the law and the facts of this case and misreads Bennion
v. ANR, supra, and Sam Oil, supra. It is not the operator or any other party who
"gives" such opportunity; it is the recognition of correlative rights through the
enactment of the Conservation Act's provisions that "gives" such an opportunity.
Under the law of capture alone, an adjoining landowner has no rights to participate in
his neighbor's well, and a nonconsent penalty would have no meaning where
production is not shared.
The Conservation Act "gives" (or in the words of Bennion v. ANR, "grants") the
adjoining landowner the option of participating in his neighbor's well, as a recognition
by the state of correlative rights. The neighbor "gives" nothing; the statute does.
However, it places no requirements on the neighbor to mail an AFE, send an engraved
invitation, or otherwise. It only requires written notice, which the Landowners in this
case received on numerous occasions.
Where the parties are unable to negotiate an agreement, or if one party refuses

AA

or fails to respond, the statute provides a mechanism for the party proposing to drill a
well to be able to do so.

In this way, the drilling party is not unconstitutionally

deprived, by reason of the intransigence of the other party, of his own property right to
drill a well.23
The statute, as written with a carefully-worded definition of "nonconsenting
owner," adroitly balances the rights and interests of the various types of parties
involved. The court need not, and should not, adopt the Petitioner's argument to read
more into the statute than should be there, and thereby create some extra-statutory and
special obligations on the part of drilling parties to coddle non-risk-taking parties,
upsetting the balance that the legislature struck.

The Conservation Act has been

amended on more than one occasion in response to considerable history and experience
over the past 46 years. All that is consciously and purposefully required by the statute

23

Petitioner once again has it backwards. The unconstitutionality would flow the
other direction if a party were deprived, pursuant to the operation of a statute, of his
right to drill on his own property due to the nonresponsiveness of his neighbor. Rather
than deprive the drilling party of his right to drill, the statute provides his neighbor with
the option to participate in the well. As cogently stated in Bennion v. ANR:
That he had the option of participating in the costs of drilling or
being subject to a penalty was a grant to him (at the expense of the
participating working interest owners) because of the statute's
recognition of correlative rights.
819 P.2d at 347 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Nonconsenting owners are thus "given" (granted) by the statute the option to
participate (at the expense of the participants in the well), thus avoiding the
constitutional difficulty that depriving the participants the opportunity to drill would
present. Moreover, it also avoids the "serious constitutional problem which would
arise if the State simply compelled participation in a speculative venture." Id., 819
P.2d at 347, n. 8, (citing 5 W. Summers, Oil and Gas ch. 29, § 975, at 128 (1966))
(emphasis added).

is written notice followed by the failure to consent in advance or agree to share
proportionately in the costs (or lease), in a unit or otherwise, without more. These
requirements were satisfied in the present case, and Respondents believe that the
Landowners were given adequate advance written notice and opportunity to participate
in the Wells within the meaning of and in ample compliance with the Conservation Act.
V.

THE TERMS OF THE POOLING ORDER ARE JUST AND
REASONABLE.

Petitioner argues that the "terms" of the Pooling Order (essentially, the 225%
nonconsent penalty) are unjust and unreasonable in that they penalize the
"unsophisticated, absentee Landowners" and unduly reward Respondents who he
believes should have sought spacing previously. He argues that the operator knew or
should have known at the time the Wells were drilled that they would drain 160 acres,
that the Wells were not wildcat wells, and that, with respect to the 5-266 Well, its
location is particularly egregious in regard to its proximity to the Landowners'
property. Petitioner also attempts to taint the motive of Respondents by suggesting that
they opposed the spacing efforts of Petitioner and thereafter sought protection of the
Conservation Act by seeking a nonconsent penalty.
Once again, Petitioner's arguments are misplaced.

As discussed above,

Respondents tried on numerous occasions to get the Landowners to lease or participate
in the DW Unit, and had no other affirmative duty to seek spacing at any time. The
Board specifically found that the Wells carried a moderate amount of risk, and

Petitioner has not marshaled any evidence to refute the Board's findings. Petitioner
cites to no case that suggests that the nonconsent penalty imposed in the Pooling Order
is inconsistent with the level of risk taken in the drilling of the Wells.24
In Bennion v. ANR, supra, the court upheld the imposition by the Board of a
175% nonconsent penalty upon the owner of an unleased mineral interest in a drilling
unit for the second well drilled in such unit. The court found that, though a first well
had been drilled in the unit that had been in production, even the drilling of a second
well in the same unit was not risk-free, thereby justifying the 175% nonconsent penalty.
The Conservation Act, § 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D), allows for a minimum of 150%
and a maximum penalty of 300%, commonly referred to as a "nonconsent penalty," a
"risk penalty" or "risk compensation."

Sam Oil, supra, 817 P.2d at 302.

"A

nonconsent penalty is designed to ensure that non-participating owners do not benefit
from the successful outcome of risk they do not take."

Id.

"The purpose of a

nonconsent penalty is to balance the costs, benefits, and risks of drilling a well among
the diverse parties. The nonconsenting parties avoid any risk; the participating parties
assume it." Bennion v. ANR Production, supra, 819 P.2d at 348. "[T]he penalty
provides an incentive for parties to participate in drilling, resulting in increased
24

Petitioner suggests that Cowling dealt with a "wildcat" well. However, even in
Cowling, the well in question was completed in a known geologic formation, providing
the BLM in that case with "some basis for surmising that [the well] might drain gas
from under the BLM tract." 830 P.2d at 229. Petitioners' reliance upon Harken,
supra, is also misplaced as that case dealt with the definition of "wildcat" well only for
the purposes of qualifying Harken's well for a statutory "wildcat" well tax credit.

production consistent with the public policy of this state." Id. at 348-349; see also
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 ("It is declared to be in the public interest to foster,
encourage and promote the development, production and utilization of natural resources
of oil and gas in the state of Utah..."). The imposition of a nonconsent penalty on
Petitioner and the Landowners accomplishes these purposes and is therefore
appropriate.
The percentage of nonconsent penalty must relate to the risks assumed by the
consenting parties.

As indicated above, and as shown at the Board hearing,

Respondents assumed substantial risk in the drilling of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells. Both
wells are located on the outer boundary of the DW Unit and, to that extent, were more
exploratory in nature rather than development. See the summary of Mike Farrens'
testimony in the Statement of Facts above relating to the substantial risks at the time of
drilling associated with coal seam thickness, water disposal, gas gathering and
compression, and production potential.
To fail to impose a nonconsent penalty upon Petitioner would be unfair to
Respondents. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
"[it] would unfairly injure the participating working interest
owners to require them to absorb all the losses from the well
but force them to share the profits. Such a result would
encourage owners who might otherwise contribute to the
costs of a well in advance to hold out until the results of
drilling become known, because they would then be able to
obtain the benefits of the well without the risk."

Sam Oil} supra, 817 P.2d at 304. This is the same concern that was expressed in the
policy of the Conservation Act, namely, owners must be encouraged to join units and
participate or know, in the alternative, that they will be expected to compensate those
who do for the associated risks they take.
Given that the Board has special expertise in assessing and evaluating the risk of
drilling, and given the Board's findings that the drilling of the Wells entailed moderate
risk and that the Wells were exploratory Wells (see the description of Mr. Fan-ens'
testimony in the Statement of Fact above), the Board's imposition of a 225%
nonconsent penalty is entirely appropriate. Substantial evidence supports those findings
as demonstrated in the Record, and the court should uphold, and give substantial
deference to, those findings based on the Board's expertise, under the reasonableness
and rationality standard.
Petitioner and NARO also try to argue that the Pooling Order penalizes
"unsophisticated, absentee" owners who seek the protection of the Conservation Act.
The Pooling Order does not penalize. It grants Petitioner the right to participate, under
conditions dictated largely by statute and as administered by the Board, in two wells
neither he nor his Landowners took any risk in drilling and that are not located on their
property.

It rewards Petitioner and the Landowners for taking advantage of the

opportunity afforded through the Conservation Act, and would have rewarded them
sooner had they come forward sooner. Their self-styled status as "unsophisticated" or

ACS

"absentee" has no bearing on the operation of the statute or the Board's determinations.
Moreover, Respondents tried every approach within reason to help inform the
Landowners of their opportunities, answer questions, and respond to numerous
telephone conversations, even to the point of suggesting that they seek competent
counsel if there was anything they did not understand, as described above.25 None of
these desperate arguments is availing to Petitioner,
VI.

CONCLUSION.

For the reasons described above and in the Brief of the Board, which
Respondents adopt and incorporate in its entirety by reference herein, the Pooling
Order of the Board should be upheld in its entirety and the Petitioner's requested relief
should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of April, 2001.
PRUITT^GUSHEE & BACHTELL
FREDERICK M^MicDONALM#4876)
GEORGEtS'. YOUNJG/(#3589)/
Attorneys for Respondents
1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-8446
25

NARO states in its amicus brief that Respondents have "taken advantage" of "over
100 mineral owners" uncommitted to the DW Unit in addition to Petitioner and the
Landowners. This statement is unfounded, unsubstantiated, and borders on slanderous.
It is belied by the numerous good faith efforts of Respondents that have been
demonstrated and are uncontested in the Record. In fact, Respondents afforded all
uncommitted owners in the DW Unit area the same "opportunities" that were afforded
to the Landowners.
so
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Subpart 3 iai—Application tor unir
Agreement
§3161.1 Preliminary consideration of
unit agreement.
The model unit agreement set forth
in §3186.1 of this title, is acceptable for
use in unproven areas. Unique situations requiring special provisions
should be clearly identified, since these
and other special conditions may necessitate a modification of the model
unit agreement set forth in §3186.1 of
this title. Any proposed special provisions or other modifications of the
model agreement should be submitted
for preliminary consideration so that
any necessary revision may be prescribed prior to execution by the interested parties. Where Federal lands constitute less than 10 percent of the total
unit area, a non-Federal unit agreement may be used. Upon submission of
such an agreement, the authorized officer will take appropriate action to
commit the Federal lands.
§3181*2 Designation of unit area;
depth of test welL
An application for designation of an
area as logically subject to development under a unit agreement and for
determination of the depth of a test
well may be filed by a proponent of
such an agreement at the proper BLM
office. Such application shall be accompanied by a map or diagram on a
scale of not less than 2 Inches to 1 mile,
outlining the area sought to be designated under this section. The Federal, State, Indian and privately owned
land should be indicated by distinctive
symbols or colors. Federal and Indian
oil and gas leases and lease applications should be identified by lease serial numbers. Geologic information, including the results of any geophysical
surveys, and any other available information showing that unitization is
necessary and advisable in the public
interest should be furnished.All information submitted under this section is
subject to part 2 of this title, which
sets forth the rules of the Department
of the Interior relating to public availability of information contained in Departmental records, as provided under
this part at §3100.4 of this chapter.
These data will be considered by the
authorized officer and the applicant
will be informed of the decision
reached. The designation of an area,
pursuant to an application filed under
this section, shall not create an exclusive right to submit an agreement for
such area, nor preclude the inclusion of
such area or any party thereof in another unit area.

§ 3181.3 Parties to unit agreement
The owners of any right, title, or interest in the oil and gas deposits to be
unitized are regarded as proper parties
to a proposed agreement. All such parties must be invited to join the agreement. If any party fails or refuses to
join the agreement, the proponent of
the agreement, at the time it is filed
for approval, must submit evidence of
reasonable effort made to obtain joinder of such party and, when requested,
the reasons for such nonjoinders. The
address of each signatory party to the
agreement should be inserted below the
signature. Each signature should be attested by at least one witness if not notarized. The signing parties may execute any number of counterparts of the
agreement with the same force and effect as if all parties signed the same
document, or may execute a ratification or consent in a separate instrument with like force and effect.
§3181.4 Inclusion
of
non-Federal
lands.
(a) Where State-owned land is to be
unitized with Federal lands, approval
of the agreement by appropriate State
officials must be obtained prior to its
submission to the proper BLM office
for final approval. When authorized by
the laws of the State in which the unitized land is situated, appropriate provision may be made in the agreement,
recognizing such laws to the extent
that they are applicable to non-Federal
unitized land.
(b) When Indian lands are included,
modification of the unit agreement
will be required where appropriate. Approval of an agreement containing Indian lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs must be obtained prior to final approval by the authorized officer.
§3181.5 Compensatory royalty payment for unleased Federal land.
The unit agreement submitted by the
unit proponent for approval by the authorized officer shall provide for payment to the Federal Government of a
12Vi percent royalty on production that
would be attributable to unleased Federal lands in a PA of the unit if said
lands were leased and committed to the
unit agreement. The value of production subject to compensatory royalty
payment shall be determined pursuant
to 30 CFR part 206, provided that no additional royalty shall be due on any
production subject to compensatory
royalty under this provision.
(58 FR 58632, Nov. 2, 1993, as amended at 59
FR 16999, Apr. 11, 1994)
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R649-2-3. Application Of Rules To Unit Agreements.
The board may suspend the application of the
general rules or orders or any part thereof, with
regard to any unit agreement approved by a duly
authorized officer of the appropriate federal agency, so
long as the conservation of oil or gas and the prevention of waste is accomplished thereby, but such suspension shall not relieve any operator from making
such reports as are otherwise required by the general
rules or orders, or as may reasonably be requested by
the board or the division in order to keep the board
and the division fully informed as to operations under
such unit agreements.
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30 U.S.C §226(m) (2000)

(m) Cooperative or unit plan; authority of Secretary of the Interior to alter or
modify; communitization or drilling agreements; term of lease, conditions;
Secretary to approve operating, drilling, or development contracts, and
subsurface storage
For the purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or gas
pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof (whether or not any part of said oil or gas
pool, field, or like area, is then subject to any cooperative or unit plan of development or
operation), lessees thereof and their representatives may unite with each other, or
jointly or separately with others, in collectively adopting and operating under a
cooperative or unit plan of development or operation of such pool,field,or like area, or
any part thereof, whenever determined and certified by the Secretary of the Interior to
be necessary or advisable in the public interest. The Secretary is thereunto authorized,
in his discretion, with the consent of the holders of leases involved, to establish, alter,
change, or revoke drilling, producing, rental, minimum royalty, and royalty requirements of such leases and to make such regulations with reference to such leases, with
like consent on the part of the lessees, in connection with the institution and operation of
any such cooperative or unit plan as he may deem necessary or proper to secure the
proper protection of the public interest. The Secretary may provide that oil and gas
leases hereafter issued under this chapter shall contain a provision requiring the lessee
to operate under such a reasonable cooperative or unit plan, and he may prescribe such
a plan under which such lessee shall operate, which shall adequately protect the rights of
all parties in interest, including the United States.
Any plan authorized by the preceding paragraph which includes lands owned by the
United States may, in the discretion of the Secretary, contain a provision whereby
authority is vested in the Secretary of the Interior, or any such person, committee, or
State or Federal officer or agency as may be designated in the plan, to alter or modify
from time to time the rate of prospecting and development and the quantity and fate of
production under such plan. All leases operated under any such plan approved or
prescribed by the Secretary shall be excepted in determining holdings or control under
the provisions of any section of this chapter.
When separate tracts cannot be independently developed and operated in conformity
with an established well-spacing or development program, any lease, or a portion
thereof, may be pooled with other lands, whether or not owned by the United States,
under a communitization or drilling agreement providing for an apportionment of
production or royalties among the separate tracts of land comprising the drilling or
spacing unit when determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be in the public
interest, and operations or production pursuant to such an agreement shall be deemed to
be operations or production as to each such lease committed thereto.
Any lease issued for a term of twenty years, or any renewal thereof, or any portion of
such lease that has become the subject of a cooperative or unit plan of development or
operation of a pool, field, or like area, which plan has the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, shall continue in force until the termination of such plan. Any other lease
issued under any section of this chapter which has heretofore or may hereafter be
committed to any such plan that contains a general provision for allocation of oil or gas
shall continue in force and effect as to the land committed so long as the lease remains

subject to the plan: Provided, That production is had in paying quantities under the
plan prior to the expiration date of the term of such lease. Any lease heretofore or
hereafter committed to any such plan embracing lands that are in part within and in
part outside of the area covered by any such plan shall be segregated into separate
leases as to the lands committed and the lands not committed as of the effective date of
unitization: Provided, however, That any such lease as to the nonunitized portion shall
continue in force and effect for the term thereof but for not less than two years from the
date of such segregation and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying
quantities. The minimum royalty or discovery rental under any lease that has become
subject to any cooperative or unit plan of development or operation, or other plan that
contains a general provision for allocation of oil or gas, shall be payable only with
respect to the lands subject to such lease to which oil or gas shall be allocated under
such plan. Any lease which shall be eliminated from any such approved or prescribed
plan, of from any communitization or drilling agreement authorized by this section, and
any lease which shall be in effect at the termination of any such approved or prescribed
plan, or at the termination Of any such communitization or drilling agreement, unless
relinquished, shall continue in effect for the original term thereof, but for not less than
two years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, on such conditions as he may
prescribe, to approve operating, drilling, or development contracts made by one or more
lessees of oil or gas leases, with one or more persons, associations, or corporations
whenever, in his discretion, the conservation of natural products or the public convenience or necessity may require it or the interests of the United States may be best
subserved thereby. All leases operated under such approved operating, drilling, or
development contracts, and interests thereunder, shall be excepted in determining
holdings or control under the provisions of this chapter.
The Secretary of the Interior, to avoid waste or to promote conservation of natural
resources, may authorize the subsurface storage of oil or gas, whether or not produced
from federally owned lands, in lands leased or subject to lease under this chapter. Such
authorization may provide for the payment of a storage fee or rental on such stored oil
or gas or, in lieu of such fee or rental, for a royalty other than that prescribed in the
lease when such stored oil or gas is produced in conjunction with oil or gas not
previously produced. Any lease on which storage is so authorized shall be extendpH at
least for the period of storage and" so long thereafter as oil or gas not previously
produced is produced in paying quantities.
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United States Department of the Interior
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Utah State Office
P.O. Box 45155
Salt Lake City, UT 841454155

FILED
MAR 2 7 2001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

?i°Mm
IV1'™)

SECRETARY BOARD OF
OILf GAS & MINING
March 26.2001

Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 145801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801
Re:

Huntington (Shallow) CBM Exploratory Unit Emery Cc „_,,
Utah Docket No. 2001-007

Gentlemen:
Texaco Exploration and Production Company is presenting and proposing an exploratory unit for
certain lands in Emery County, Utah to explore and develop natural gas resources contained in the
Fenon Formation. In conjunction with the proposed exploratory unit they are requesting that a
compulsory unitization provision be applied to the unit area under Utah Code Aim. 40-6-8. We do
not support the compulsory unitization for the reference unit. It is counter to the concept and design
of what exploratory units are formed to accomplish. We also do not believe the criteria as outlined
in 40-6-8 has been wholly satisfied. Enclosed is a copy of a letter we sent to Texaco Exploration and
Production Company and the Division of Oil Gas and Mining expressing some of our concerns.
Under our guidelines, we approve all unit agreements involving Federal lands independent of the
amount of acreage involved. Units with limited Federal acreage (< 10%) may not require the use
of the Federal format for agreements in unpro ven areas contained in our Code ofFederal Regulations
(43CFR 3186.1). As presented, we will not consent to or approve the proposed Huntington
(Shallow) CBM exploratory unit with the compulsory unitization clause or order affixed to the unit
agreement area. Our position is that no exploratory unit should be encumbered with compulsory
unitization. Land pooling should be pursued under Utah Code Ann. 40-6-6.
Sincerely,

R.A/nenricks
Chief, Branch of Fluid Minerals
Enclosure

